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Multi-ethnicity or Bi-nationalism? The Framework Agreement and 
the Future of the Macedonian State 
JENNY ENGSTRÖ M 
Department of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political 
Science 
 
This article critically evaluates the August 2001 Framework Agreement, the purpose of 
which was to end the six-month armed confrontation between the Albanian paramilitary 
force the National Liberation Army (NLA) and the Macedonian state. The author argues 
that there are several deficiencies in the Agreement, along with regional security 
concerns arising from organized crime and the unresolved status of Kosovo, which taken 
together pose a considerable obstacle to peace and stability in Macedonia. These 
deficiencies relate to problems of implementation of the Agreement, as well as to the 
question of what kind of Macedonian state it promotes. It is argued that the power -
sharing provisions laid out in the Agreement pushes Macedonia closer to the creation of 
a de facto Macedonian-Albanian bi-national state, rather than promoting a civic-
oriented, multiethnic state, and that the envisioned political decentralization undermines 
state capacity and authority, thus making the prospects for sustainable peace in 
Macedonia very precarious. 
 
 
I.   Introduction 
Following a six-month armed confrontation between the Albanian paramilitary force 
the National Liberation Army (NLA) and the Macedonian state, international 
mediation between ethnic Macedonian and Albanian political leaders resulted in the 
signing of the Framework Agreement on 13 August 2001, which intended to put an 
end to the violent conflict by redressing some of the grievances of Macedonia’s 
Albanian community. The present article seeks to critically evaluate this agreement, 
assessing, in particular, the prospects for promoting peace and ethnically inclusive 
plural democracy in Macedonia which it seeks to attain. It will be argued that there 
are several deficiencies in the Framework Agreement, along with unfavourable 
security conditions in the region arising from organized crime and the unresolved 
status of Kosovo, which combine to pose a serious challenge to peace and stability in 
Macedonia. These deficiencies relate primarily to problems of implementation and 
inclusion.    
 
First, there are problems associated with the practical implementation of the 
Framework Agreement. To begin with, the lack of ‘ownership’ of the Agreement, that 
is, the widespread perception amongst ethnic Macedonians that was imposed on them 
by ‘pro-Albanian’ Western powers, negatively affects the willingness of the 
Macedonian factions in the parliament to ratify the Agreement without first making 
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amendments to it. Because implementation of the Agreement requires a series of 
constitutional and legislative measures, its success or failure, lies to a considerable 
degree in the hands of the Macedonian parliament. Furthermore, the NLA, despite 
being largely responsible for the fighting last year, was excluded from the peace talks. 
This omission is significant in so far as it not only undermines the relevance of the 
Agreement but also makes its success dependent on the willingness of the NLA, and 
its various offshoots, to refrain from further armed activities.  
 
Second, an important question to be addressed is what kind of Macedonian state the 
Framework Agreement is designed to promote. This article suggests that while the 
power-sharing provisions laid out in the Agreement are meant to redress the 
asymmetrical power-relations between Macedonians and Albanians, little 
consideration is given to the interests of other ethnic communities in Macedonia. 
Thus, the implementation of the Agreement will effectively signify a move towards 
the creation of a de facto bi-national state in which Macedonians and Albanians 
constitute the country’s two ethno-political elites, whilst other ethnic communities are 
largely relegated to the fringes of political life.  
 
To conclude, the article considers the possible impact on the fragile Macedonian state 
structure of the provisions for power-sharing and political decentralization set out in 
the Framework Agreement, and argues that the implementation of these may in fact 
have the opposite effect to that intended, thus further undermining state capacity and 
authority, making the prospects for sustainable peace in Macedonia very precarious.  
 
II.   Ethnic Relations in the New Macedonian State 
 
Macedonia declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 in a national referendum 
that was largely boycotted by the Albanian population. Instead the Albanians staged 
their own vote in which an overwhelming majority favoured territorial autonomy 
within Macedonia. Whilst in principle favouring an independent Macedonian state, 
Albanians objected to the question put forth in the referendum, which sought 
Macedonian independence but with the option of re-joining some federal arrangement 
with Yugoslavia in the future. Only too aware of Serbia’s repressive policies towards 
the Albanians in Kosovo, however, Macedonia’s Albanian population did not want to 
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be ruled by Belgrade again. Albanian non-participation in the referendum was also a 
protest against the failure of the Macedonian political leaders to clearly define the 
legal status of the Albanian population in an independent Macedonian state. Prior to 
the referendum, the leading Albanian political party at the time, the Party for 
Democratic Prosperity (PDP), had issued a Declaration for the ‘Equal Status of 
Albanians in Macedonia’, and had made Albanian participation in the referendum 
contingent on Macedonian consideration of this Declaration. The Macedonian leaders, 
however, refused.  
 
Albanian political leaders further rejected the 1991 constitution of the newly declared 
Republic of Macedonia on the grounds that it relegated the Albanians to the status of 
second-class citizens by treating them as a minority, which in turn went against the 
Albanian community’s perception of itself as constituting not a minority but a part of 
another, Albanian, majority. To the Albanians, therefore, the Macedonian constitution 
of 1991 represented a step backwards in terms of their legal status. This can be 
contrasted to the 1974 constitution of Yugoslavia, which accorded equal rights to all 
ethnic units of the federation, of which the Albanian population was one. Nonetheless, 
in the years following Macedonia’s split from Yugoslavia, a more moderate Albanian 
leadership emerged which confirmed its commitment to the unity of the Republic of 
Macedonia, whilst demanding measures to grant the Albanian community non-
territorial autonomy in the political sphere (Ackermann 2000: 61-62). But as violence 
erupted in Macedonia in the spring of 2001, Albanian demands vis-à-vis the 
Macedonians again hardened, as did the Macedonian response, thus leading to a 
deepening of the rift between the two communities. Thus, although the Framework 
Agreement is intended to bring peace to Macedonia, it contains little by way of 
reconciliation between the two communities, which naturally complicates the 
promotion of peace and stability in Macedonia as the positions of the main 
antagonists remain polarized. 
 
Throughout the 1990s, the relationship between Macedonians and Albanians 
remained tense, resulting in occasional violent confrontations. Nevertheless, in 
contrast to Kosovo and Bosnia, a full-fledged armed conflict was avoided. Even at the 
height of the Kosovo crisis, which led to a massive flow of Albanian refugees into 
Macedonia and put a severe strain on the country’s resources and inter-ethnic peace, 
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Macedonia still managed to avoid the emergence of large-scale violence. The fact that 
peace prevailed throughout the 1990s has often been attributed to three factors: the 
leadership of the then president of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov; the deployment of a 
United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) whose primary task was 
to monitor the border between Macedonia and Yugoslavia in order to deter any 
potential act of aggression from Belgrade; and the diplomatic efforts of the OSCE 
High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel, who played a pivotal 
role in mediating the dispute over Albanian-language education. In the latter case, the 
tireless efforts to bring about an agreement between Macedonians and Albanians on 
the issue of higher education in the Albanian language eventually resulted in the 
establishment of the trilingual (Albanian, Macedonian and English) South East 
European University in Tetovo. However, another factor that arguably contributed to 
the relative state of peace in Macedonia during these years was the fact that the 
country managed to make a transition to at least a procedural, if highly corrupt, 
democratic system, in which the Albanian community played an active part. Hence, 
on the top level, Macedonians and Albanians found themselves engaged in a continual 
political dialogue with a fair amount of cooperation across ethnic party lines. This 
arguably helped to defuse some of the tension between the two communities on at 
least the political level.  
 
A further source of contention between Macedonians and Albanians throughout the 
1990s was the Macedonian constitution and, in particular, the wording of the 
preamble. This explicitly declared the right of the Macedonian people to a state, 
envisaging the Republic of Macedonia as “a national state of the Macedonian people, 
in which full equality as citizens and permanent co-existence with the Macedonian 
people is provided for Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romanics and other nationalities 
living in the Republic of Macedonia… ”1 Macedonian ‘ownership’ of the state was 
also implied in some of the articles of the constitution, including article 7, which 
declared the Macedonian language (using the Cyrillic alphabet) the official language 
of the state, and article 19, which made special reference to the Macedonian Orthodox 
Church. On the whole, however, the constitution embraced a liberal, civic concept of 
citizenship, providing for equal rights for all citizens of Macedonia regardless of 
                                                 
1 For the English text of the Framework Agreement, including the Preamble of the 1991 Constitution of 
the Republic of Macedonia, see for example, http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/mk00000_.html 
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ethnic and/or religious affinity. Some have even suggested that the 1991 constitution 
also granted certain collective rights to minorities,2 although a closer examination of 
the constitution reveals that those rights referred to as ‘collective’ were in fact 
reducible to the individual. In sum, the Macedonian constitution represented –  at least 
on paper –  a model of liberal values. 
 
But whereas Macedonians regard the Republic of Macedonia as their nation-state, in 
which other ethnic groups are granted equal citizen rights, the Albanian elite has 
persistently demanded the creation of a bi-national state, in which the Albanian 
population would be recognized as a constituent nation on par with the Macedonian. 
Their claim is based on the observation that the Albanian community accounts for at 
least 25 per cent (and according to Albanian estimates perhaps as much as 35 to 40 
per cent) of the total population of Macedonia, and that in some towns and villages 
Albanians outnumber Macedonians. Albanians do not, however, object to the name 
‘Republic of Macedonia’, which they regard “as being territorial without any specific 
Slav connotations” (Poulton 2000: 187). Hence, in their view the name ‘Macedonia’ 
does not imply ethnic Macedonian ownership of the state. Instead, the conflict 
between Macedonians and Albanians over the last decade has tended to focus on the 
legal and political status of the Albanian population and on the political and cultural 
character of the Macedonian state. The Macedonian-Albanian conflict is, as a 
consequence, not merely over rights for the latter group in a country dominated by the 
former but, more fundamentally, about who controls the state and what kind of state 
Macedonia should be. Ultimately, then, the conflict between Macedonians and 
Albanians boils down to the question of who holds the power. 
 
For all its flaws, the Macedonian state has nonetheless been more inclusive in terms 
of its non-Macedonian population than have most other former Yugoslav republics 
since 1991. Despite restrictions on the use of the Albanian language in higher 
education and political bodies, as well as de facto discrimination in employment, 
Albanians in Macedonia have by and large enjoyed extensive civil and political rights. 
Economically they have generally been better off than their kin in Albania and 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Ljubomir Frčkoski (1998) Model of the Interethnical Relations in Macedonia, 
Skopje: Kryg, and Gjorgi Caca (2001), “Status and Rights of Nationalities in the Republic of 
Macedonia”, in James Pettifer, The New Macedonian Question, Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
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Kosovo, and they have suffered none of the political discrimination that Kosovar 
Albanians experienced under Miloševic’s rule. Although Macedonian politicians have 
dragged their feet over the years on many issues concerning the development of 
minority rights, there have been some, if slow, improvements. Hence, it is hardly 
warranted to talk of Albanian exclusion from Macedonian society or of a steady path 
of deteriorating ethno-political relations that eventually culminated in an Albanian 
rebellion last year.  
 
III.   War in Macedonia, 2001 
 
When fighting broke out in the Tetovo region of Macedonia in February 2001, the 
Macedonian government appeared to be caught by surprise. Initially, it was unclear 
what the objectives of the attacks by the NLA were, but eventually their demands 
“came to echo those of Albanian politicians –  insisting that Albanian become an 
official state language and that Albanians gain equal status with Macedonians.” (Perry 
2001). The NLA thus effectively hijacked the political programme of the Albanian 
parties in Macedonia, prompting Albanian politicians to respond to the challenge to 
their authority and credibility by trying to coopt the armed struggle, seeking to 
become the political arm of the NLA in order to prevent themselves from being 
marginalized.  
 
The international community treated the violent confrontation between the NLA and 
the Macedonian armed forces largely as a conflict arising primarily from Albanian 
frustration at their lack of equal rights, and the Framework Agreement was 
accordingly designed to redress those deficiencies. But the dispute over rights does 
not suffice as an explanation of the war in Macedonia. A contributing factor was the 
instability emanating from the still unresolved future status of Kosovo and, more 
specifically, NATO’s failure to disarm the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and 
effectively police the border between Kosovo and Macedonia. Additionally, it has 
been suggested that last year’s fighting was related to the extensive networks of 
organized crime and corruption that pervade both the Albanian and Macedonian 
communities, and the Balkans in general.  
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Since becoming an independent state, Macedonia has suffered from pervasive state 
corruption, fuelled by a political party system that is largely financed by illegal 
means. Also contributing to the weakness of the Macedonian state are factors such as 
continued opposition from Greece (which refuses to recognize its northern neighbour 
under any name that includes ‘Macedonia’), patronising attitudes from Bulgaria 
(which maintains that Macedonians are nothing other than ‘lost’ members of the 
Bulgarian nation), fear of Serbian attack and the international community’s initial 
failure to recognize the legitimacy of the Macedonia state, as well as the pervasive 
Albanian question. Efforts to build a sustainable peace in Macedonia are further 
obstructed by the political immaturity of most politicians as well as the lack of 
political leadership that has been on offer since Kiro Gligorov stepped down as 
President in 1999. And as long as the legitimate economy does not provide an 
alternative, organized criminal activity, which is closely linked to the kind of ‘new 
wars’ of which Mary Kaldor (1999) speaks, will remain an obstacle to peace.  
 
In fact, it has become increasingly popular amongst scholars and journalists to look at 
last year’s civil war as being directly linked to the growing problem of organized 
crime in the Balkans. The emergence of an Albanian-led mafia in the 1990s has been 
particularly singled out.  According to Hislope, “a coalescence of interests between a 
national liberation movement and a narco-mafia was the enabling factor that made 
ethnic conflict possible in the Albanian-inhabited lands of Kosovo, southern Serbia, 
and Macedonia.” (2001: 5). But in contrast to those who maintain that the sole cause 
of Macedonia’s war was due to the interest of Albanian criminal networks to keep 
smuggling channels open, Hislope offers a more nuanced explanation, arguing that 
“ [t]he top leaderships of the Albanian paramilitary forces have no identifiable 
participation in the drug trade”, and that “ [m]ost leaders of the Albanian 
paramilitaries are simply men sorely aggrieved by the plight of Albanians in the 
southern Balkans and have taken up arms to pursue their national cause.”(2001: 24). 
The Albanian mafia thus provided the ”logistical advantage” to the national liberation 
movements of Macedonia and Kosovo, and it was the attainment of weapons that 
ultimately compelled Albanian groups to resort to force. (Hislope 2001: 32,39). Mafia 
activity, as illustrated by the Italian case, can only work effectively in a climate of 
state-sanctioned corruption, and a weak, or even failing, a state such as Macedonia 
thus offers an optimal environment for an illicit economy.  
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IV.   The Fundamentals of the Framework Agreement 
 
The parties to the Framework Agreement, which convened in the Macedonian town of 
Ohrid last August, were the President of Macedonia and the leaders of the four main 
political parties in Macedonia, two of which are ethnic Macedonian and the other two 
ethnic Albanian. The signing of the Agreement was witnessed by the two 
international mediators, Francois Leotard, representing the EU, and James Pardew, 
the US representative. The overall objective of the Agreement is to “ [secure] the 
future of Macedonia’s democracy and [permit] the development of closer and more 
integrated relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the Euro-Atlantic 
community.”3 Rejecting the use of violence for political aims and affirming the 
territorial integrity and unitary status of the Republic of Macedonia, the Agreement 
envisages the “complete voluntary disarmament of the ethnic Albanian armed groups 
and their complete voluntary disbandment.”4 The vague wording leaves ample room 
for differing interpretations, which is ever more significant given that the “ethnic 
Albanian armed groups” are not themselves parties to the agreement, which means 
that they cannot be obliged to abide by it. Security on the ground is of course a 
minimum requirement for the successful implementation of the Framework 
Agreement but there is a risk that since the NLA was excluded from the peace 
negotiations it has the power to undermine the Agreement’s legitimacy, thus retaining 
the option of further military actions, which might well lead to total state collapse. 
 
Annex A of the Framework Agreement lays down a series of constitutional 
amendments aimed at enhancing the power-sharing mechanisms of Macedonia’s 
political system. The overall objective of these measures is to eliminate any structural, 
institutional and practical discrimination of Albanians in the social and political 
spheres. The fact that these amendments are subject to approval by a vote in the 
Macedonian parliament meant that, from the outset, the survival of the Agreement has 
been dependent on the members of parliament, many of whom oppose a number of 
the provisions set forth in the Agreement. Representatives of the European Union and 
                                                 
3 Framework Agreement, Ohrid and Skopje, 13 August 2001. The English text of the Agreement can be 
accessed under http://president.gov.mk/eng/info/dogovor.htm (16 August 2001). 
4 Ibid. 
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the United States have, therefore, exerted constant diplomatic pressure on 
Macedonia’s political leaders to ensure that the Framework Agreement is ratified in 
full. The EU, for example, set as a condition for the organization of an international 
donors conference for Macedonia that the constitutional amendments set forth in 
Annex A as well as the revised law on local self-government must be passed by the 
Macedonian parliament in accordance with the Framework Agreement. Such a law, 
however, has long been the subject of contentious debate as many Macedonians 
believe that its implementation would effectively result in the fragmentation of 
Macedonia along ethnic lines, which ultimately might lead to the de facto secession of 
the Albanian dominated parts of Macedonia. But, bowing to international pressure, 
and in recognition of Macedonia’s dire need of economic assistance, the parliament 
finally passed a new law on local self-government on 24 January 2002. A donors 
conference was subsequently held in Brussels in March. 
 
In an effort to promote power-sharing arrangements, the Framework Agreement also 
establishes that the passing of certain laws and constitutional amendments relating to 
the law on local self-government as well as issues affecting culture, language and 
education shall require a “majority of the votes of Representatives claiming to belong 
to the communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia”. This 
effectively grants the Albanians a right of veto, even without the support of other 
ethnic minorities, given that the number of Albanian representatives in the parliament 
exceeds the total number of MPs belonging to non-Albanian ethnic minorities. In this 
regard, therefore, the Framework Agreement fails to promote a multiethnic plural 
democratic system as the power-sharing mechanisms designed favour only the 
Albanian community.  
 
While reaffirming that “The official language throughout Macedonia and in the 
international relations of Macedonia is the Macedonian language”,5 the Framework 
Agreement establishes that “ [a] ny other language spoken by at least 20 percent of the 
population is also an official language [… ].”6 Setting the linguistic contradiction aside 
in the English, official, version of the Agreement –  the use of the definite article 
implying, semantically, that there can only be one official language –  the new 
                                                 
5 Framework Agreement, paragraph 6.4 –  emphasis added 
6 Framework Agreement, paragraph 6.5 –  emphasis added 
 11
provision concerning language means that Albanian, the only non-Macedonian 
language spoken by more than 20 per cent of the total population, is made a second 
official language under certain conditions, whilst the use of other languages such as 
Serbian, Turkish, Aroumanian and Rom in municipal public affairs are subject to 
decision by the local authorities. According to Paragraph 6.6. of the Framework 
Agreement such decisions shall be made ‘democratically’ on the local decision-
making level, which leaves ample room for discretionary interpretations by municipal 
leaders, and does little to protect the interests of the smaller minorities.  
 
In sum, and as will be elaborated in the following section, rather than providing a 
comprehensive, inclusive framework for a non-discriminatory political structure, the 
Agreement seems designed mainly to redress Albanian complaints in order to avert 
further armed confrontation.  
 
V.   The Framework Agreement: A Problematic Blueprint for Macedonia 
 
A distinction, however, needs to be drawn between the conflict between the 
Macedonian and Albanian communities that has been latent since 1991 and the armed 
confrontation that occurred last year. Most Macedonians and a growing number of 
international analysts maintain that last year’s mini-war had little to do with 
instituting rights for the Albanians. According to this view, the Framework 
Agreement fails to take into account the more immediate reasons behind the war, such 
as previously mentioned, organized crime and the question of Kosovo. Yet it would 
be misleading to deny that throughout the 1990s the conflict between Macedonians 
and Albanians did, at least in part, concern the question of rights. Thus, the 
Agreement does address some of the issues that divided the two communities during 
Macedonia’s first decade of independence. As such, the Agreement represents an 
amendment to the legal structures of the Macedonian political system, aimed at 
creating more symmetrical power relations between the Macedonian and Albanian 
communities. Nonetheless, many Macedonians, as well as their politicians, harbour a 
deep dislike for the Framework Agreement, which they consider to be imposed on 
them by the international community in response to Albanian ‘terrorism’. According 
to Aleksandar Damovski, editor of the Macedonian daily Dnevnik, the provisions set 
forth in the Agreement were legitimate, but not the means used to achieve them: 
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I find the constitutional changes that improve the civic character of our state 
necessary, and that they would have come into being even without the military 
pressure of the Albanians. The main problem is that it all happened as a result 
of the aggression by the Albanian terrorists in Macedonia, and therefore the 
agreement signed in Ohrid looks like the result of those terrorist activities. 
(South Slavic Report 2001: v. 3 no. 32). 
 
Hence, there is a risk that Macedonian resentment towards the Agreement, and 
towards the Albanian population, might eventually prompt an aggressive backlash, 
which would further undermine the prospects for peace. Whether such a reaction from 
the Macedonian community occurs depends in part on whether it continues to 
perceive the international community as working against Macedonian interests. 
 
In a report by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) several factors are identified 
that pose an obstacle to effective implementation of the Framework Agreement, 
including “ [c]riminality and corruption that pervade the Albanian and Macedonian 
communities as well as the national government”, “ [u]nderdeveloped political parties 
and immature political leadership”, poor economy, “ [u]ncertainty concerning 
Kosovo’s final status”, Albanian and Macedonian diasporas that sponsor extremist 
factions in both communities, as well as an “ international community that is overly 
anxious to claim success and declare victory.” (USIP 2001). Two of the factors above 
particularly condition the prospects for peace and stability in Macedonia, irrespective 
of whether they also contributed to the emergence of war in the first place. First, the 
instability emerging from Kosovo, which has arisen in large part as a result of the 
international community’s unwillingness to address the issue of the long-term 
political and legal status of Kosovo (the province), continues to affect the stability of 
Macedonia, thus threatening to undermine the peace and stability envisaged in the 
Framework Agreement. Second, Macedonia, as well as other countries in the region, 
is rife with corruption, organized crime and mafia rule, all of which constitute serious 
threats to peace and stability. The Framework Agreement, however, mistakenly 
assumes that Macedonia possesses the capacity to effectively deal with the instability 
caused by corruption and organized crime. Moreover, it does not take into 
consideration the whole political-security and socio-economic picture of the Balkans, 
and it is linked with EU support only in a negative sense, as illustrated by the 
provision that the organization of a donors conference was directly conditional on the 
 13
Macedonian parliament’s approval of the new law on local self-government. Hence, 
by offering more sticks than carrots, the Agreement fails to motivate the people of 
Macedonia to commit to genuine peace-building. As previously noted, the 
Macedonian state today is dangerously weak, lacking any consolidated political 
capacity and the public confidence in the politicians, on both side of the ethnic divide, 
is extremely tenuous. International diplomatic intervention in Macedonia –  
characterized to a large extent by the setting of a seemingly endless number of 
conditions for Macedonia, some of which amount to sheer blackmail –  has further 
undermined the capacity and authority of the state and its political leaders. The 
Framework Agreement promotes decentralization of the Macedonian state, under the 
(misguided) assumption that this will increase the effectiveness and equity of state 
structures. But, as will be elaborated on in the next section, decentralization of an 
already weak state can be a very destructive approach, and might well lead to the 
further weakening of the state, which could well result in the total collapse of 
Macedonia.  
 
Implicit in the Framework Agreement is the objective of transforming Macedonia 
from an ethnic nation-state into a civic/multi-ethnic state by discriminating in favour 
of the Albanian population. Paradoxically, therefore, the Agreement seeks to promote 
the development of a civic state through ethnically defined measures. Subsequent 
amendments by the Macedonian parliament to some of its provisions have, however, 
undermined the move toward a civic state, and instead sowed the seeds for the 
development of a bi-national state. Neither Macedonians nor Albanians pay much 
attention to the interests of other ethnic groups in the country. These have largely 
been left out of the political equation, and thus the Agreement disqualifies as a 
blueprint for the development of ethnically inclusive, plural democracy. Rather, it is a 
framework for the creation of a de facto bi-national political system.  
 
Despite calls from the Turkish community in Macedonia for a more inclusive inter-
ethnic dialogue, the smaller minorities in Macedonia have also largely been neglected 
in the recent crisis. Instead, the debate has centred on the question whether Macedonia 
is or should be a mono-national or bi-national state, not a multi-national/ethnic state. 
As noted by the Macedonian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights and the 
International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights:  
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On the one hand, the events resulted in the Macedonian majority population’s 
increased sensitivity to the Albanian issue, leading to overreactions, growing 
mistrust and fear of movements towards secession. On the other hand, the 
ideas of bilateral dialogue or bi-nationalism provoked reactions on the side of 
the other minorities in Macedonia –  the ethnic Turks, the Roma, the ethnic 
Serbians and last but not least –  the Vlachs. (Joint Statement 2001) 
 
Furthermore, a report by Radio Free Europe draws attention to an opinion poll 
conducted after the conclusion of the Framework Agreement, which shows that as 
much as 50 per cent of Macedonia’s Turkish population would boycott the 
parliamentary elections planned for 2002, indicating that “ the Turkish minority, 
whose leadership backed the Macedonian side during the conflict, is very unhappy. 
Their disappointment presumably stems from the fact that, “of all the minorities in 
Macedonia, only the Albanians will benefit from the agreement.” (RFE/RL Balkan 
Report 2001: v. 5 no. 60). 
 
As suggested above, the conflict between Macedonians and Albanians is largely a 
struggle over the question of who controls the Macedonian state and what kind of 
state Macedonia should be. Under the Framework Agreement, the Preamble of the 
1991 Macedonian constitution was to be changed, removing any mention of specific 
ethnic or national groups, and instead referring solely to the citizens of Macedonia. 
Thus, the new Preamble was to effectively mark “a change in the official character of 
the Macedonian state.” Accordingly, the aim was “ to transform Macedonia into a civil 
society of equal citizens, without reference to ethnic background.” (RFE/RL Balkan 
Report 2001: v. 5 no. 58). This, however, failed, as the new Preamble agreed to in the 
Ohrid negotiations was subject to contentious debate between Macedonian and 
Albanian politicians, resulting in further revision before being passed by a vote in the 
parliament. The final version of the Preamble that was eventually adopted again 
makes reference to the ethnic and national groups of Macedonia, but elevates the 
Albanians to a higher status than the 1991 Preamble had afforded them. A comparison 
of the three different versions of the Preamble –  the 1991 Preamble; the re-worded 
Preamble that the signatories to the Framework Agreement agreed on in Ohrid; and 
the version subsequently adopted by the parliament –  illustrates the lack of will 
amongst the political leaders of Macedonia (Macedonians and Albanians alike) to 
commit themselves to a civic Macedonian state. As noted earlier, the 1991 Preamble 
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confirmed the Macedonian nation as the primary ‘owners’ of the Macedonian state, 
hence the de facto creation of an ethnic Macedonian nation-state. Paradoxically, the 
Framework Agreement initially produced a civic Preamble, whilst promoting special 
provisions that effectively ethnicized the constitution itself. This is markedly in 
contrast with the 1991 Preamble and constitution, where the former reflected a strong 
ethnic orientation of the Macedonian state, whilst the latter emphasized a civic 
approach to citizenship and rights. The final version of the Preamble that was adopted 
by the Macedonian parliament thus reintroduces the ethnic factor, referring to “The 
citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, the Macedonian people, as well as citizens 
living within its borders who are part of the Albanian people, the Turkish people, the 
Vlach people, the Serbian people, the Romany people, the Bosniak people and 
others”.7 Hence, the net effect is that Macedonia, through the Framework Agreement 
and its subsequent amendment by the Macedonian parliament, has been left with a 
constitution and Preamble that are both ethnic in character. This, of course, 
contravenes the intention of the international community, which was to promote a 
civic, non-ethnic yet multi-cultural Macedonian state.  
 
VI.  Power-Sharing and Political Decentralization: A Road to Peace in 
Macedonia? 
 
In a system of political power sharing “decision-making ideally occurs by consensus. 
All major ethnic groups in the country are included in the government, and minorities, 
especially, are assured influence in policy-making on sensitive issues such as 
language use and education.” (Harris & Reilly 1998: 139). Although decision-making 
by consensus was never a policy in Macedonia, every government since the country’s 
declaration of independence from Yugoslavia has been made up of a coalition 
between a Macedonian and an Albanian political party. It is commonly recognized 
that collaboration across ethnic lines on the top political level has been the norm since 
1991. In its eagerness to hail Macedonia a successful case of interethnic coexistence, 
the international community has also encouraged power-sharing arrangements 
between Macedonians and Albanians in the belief that this would promote peace and 
stability. Efforts by the EU and the United States to promote a system of power 
                                                 
7 The English text can be accessed at http://www.assembly.gov.mk/Eng/rule.htm#1 
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sharing in Macedonia has been premised on the assumption that the conflict in 
Macedonia was rooted in Macedonian discrimination of the Albanian minority.  
 
As Harris and Reilly point out, successful power sharing requires “a sufficiently 
strong core of moderates –  including both political elites and the broader civil society 
–  that seeks pragmatic coexistence in a multi-ethnic society.” (Harris & Reilly 1998: 
143). But it is doubtful whether in Macedonia today such a moderate core exists on 
either side of the ethnic divide.  The political will required by both Macedonians and 
Albanians to share power is lacking as both sides have become radicalized since the 
fighting erupted last year. Furthermore, power-sharing arrangements are generally 
thought of as constituting a “ temporary measure to build confidence until more 
customary, sometimes-win-and-sometimes-lose democracy can be embraced.” (Harris 
& Reilly 1998: 143). But in the Macedonian case it seems that the international 
community envisages power-sharing mechanisms as a permanent solution to the 
Macedonian-Albanian conflict. Past experience with power-sharing arrangements in 
plural societies such as, for example, Lebanon and Malaysia, however, provide a 
strong indication that such arrangements tend to fail in the long run. Additionally, 
there is a risk that consensus-based politics across ethnic lines in Macedonia might 
effectively eliminate real debate as political leaders make deals behind closed doors. 
In a post-socialist country like Macedonia, this ‘old’ and familiar way of doing 
politics can seriously undermine the process of democratic learning.  
 
The provisions for power sharing as envisioned in the Framework Agreement are in 
fact rather limited and to the extent that the Agreement includes such provisions they 
are targeted mainly at the Albanian community, aiming to redress the asymmetrical 
power base of the Albanians vis-à-vis that of the Macedonians. As critics of the 
Framework Agreement have noted, the principle of ‘double majorities’ required for 
certain legislation, “places undue emphasis on ethnicity and thereby runs counter to 
the aim of transforming Macedonia into a civil, non-ethnically based society.” 
(RFE/RL Balkan Report 2001: v. 5 no. 58). At the same time, the Agreement does 
little to redress the existing power asymmetry between all ethnic communities in 
Macedonia, as the power-sharing provisions set forth do not adequately incorporate 
the interests of non-Albanian minorities. In this respect, therefore, the Agreement falls 
short of developing an inclusive ‘consociational’ political system in Macedonia. As 
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was pointed out earlier, the Agreement effectively reinforces the ethnicization of 
Macedonian political life, rather than promoting a civic concept of the Macedonian 
state.  
 
The Framework Agreement further envisions the promotion of peace and stability in 
Macedonia through the implementation of a new law on local self-government aimed 
at the decentralization of the Macedonian political system, whereby some of the 
political decision-making will be delegated to the local communities, many of which 
are dominated by either Macedonians or Albanians. The Macedonian parliament 
formally approved a new law on local self-government in January 2002, following 
months of contentious debate as well as pressure from the United States and EU. 
From an ethnic Macedonian point of view, however, the new law threatens to 
undermine the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the Macedonian state 
as, they contend, it makes it increasingly possible for Albanian dominated 
communities to effectively secede from Macedonia. Albanian politicians, on their 
part, maintain that the new law does not go far enough in granting rights to the 
municipalities (RFE/RL Balkan Report 2002: v. 6 no. 7)  
 
The international community, including the OSCE, EU and international NGOs, has 
sought to promote political decentralization of Macedonia as a means of building 
peace and more equitable relations between Macedonians and Albanians. But, as Lake 
and Rothchild maintain, political decentralization “ is likely to be most stable and 
effective when there are multiple regions or groups with numerous cross-cutting 
cleavages and relatively balanced capabilities. That is, decentralization is most viable 
when no one region or group is sufficiently strong that it is likely to achieve 
dominance.” (Lake & Rothchild 2001: 32). In Macedonia, however, cross-cutting 
cleavages are generally lacking, and territorial decentralization is likely to create 
communities in which either Macedonians or Albanians dominate, not communities 
where the power balance between various ethnic groups is symmetrical. Hence, 
decentralization will simply recreate spheres of political dominance by one group or 
the other, thus creating new possible arenas for conflict. Any genuine and ethnically 
inclusive power-sharing arrangement is thus unlikely to be effectively implemented. 
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VII.   Conclusion 
 
This article has sought to highlight some of the problems, inconsistencies and 
paradoxes plaguing the Framework Agreement, as well as vague institutional 
provisions whose interpretation may well become subject to future disputes. Further, 
it has sought to demonstrate that the implementation of the Agreement is premised on 
the mistaken assumption that the Macedonian state is strong enough, and possesses 
the capacity as well as political will, to live up to the provisions of the Agreement in 
practice. Yet another problem with the Agreement is that it falls short of its intended 
purpose of promoting a civic concept of the Macedonian state, an idea that has been 
endorsed by an international community that lacks a proper understanding of the 
complexities of the Macedonian situation. Instead of promoting a multi-ethnic, civic, 
state, however, the Agreement sows the seeds for the creation of a bi-national, 
Macedonian-Albanian state, in which other ethnic communities remain marginalized 
in the political sphere. In addition, the Macedonian parliament’s failure to adopt the 
Framework Agreement without forcing through amendments on several points is 
indicative of the unwillingness amongst political hardliners on both the Macedonian 
and Albanian side to subscribe to a civic notion of the state. The further revision of 
the new Preamble particularly illustrates the tug-of-war between Albanians and 
Macedonians over the control of the Macedonian state.  
 
Significantly, the Agreement and its supporters (the international community in 
particular) also fail to take into account two essential factors that condition the 
prospects for peace and stability in Macedonia, namely, the unresolved issues 
concerning Kosovo, and widespread organized crime. Without addressing these two 
factors, the building of sustainable peace and stability in Macedonia is simply 
unrealistic.  
 
On a final note, as George Schöpflin argues, “democratic nationhood is composed of 
three key, interdependent elements: civil society, the state and ethnicity.” (2000: 35). 
When civil society and the state are weak, as they are in Macedonia, ethnicity comes 
to dominate. For peace to be given a serious chance in Macedonia, the Framework 
Agreement should have included provisions outlining how to strengthen the 
Macedonian state and civil society. After over ten years of independence, state 
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institutions as well as civil society in Macedonia remain weak, leaving the country 
and its people vulnerable to ethnic chauvinism and criminal structures, which in turn 
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